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Endpoint Management with Microsoft Intune

Protect Intune against Attacks

Part 31 of 45 in Endpoint Management with Microsoft Intune

Treasure chest with the Intune logo symbolizing protecting Intune against attacks

Introduction

Microsoft Intune experienced major public interest through cyberattacks related with US Organization Stryker and Iran war.

The core issue is a "Living-off-the-Land" (LotL) technique where attackers use a company's own management software against them.

The attackers gained privileged access through hijacked Administrator accounts and abused Intune to wipe out approximately 200'000 devices.

These events highlight the critical importance of securing Microsoft 365 infrastructure, specifically by treating identity as the primary perimeter and reinforcing the security of endpoint management (MDM) platforms.


Key takeaways and caveats

  • Identity attacks are the most common way adversaries get access to victims, therefore identity should be the key security perimeter
  • Privileged accounts and Intune admin roles can severely impact your endpoint infrastructure
    • Intune allows attackers to remotely wiping devices, installing harmful applications, or running malicious scripts
  • Intune does not have a recycle bin or restore options for deleted devices
  • Intune is not designed for managing mission-critical endpoints - as a cloud-based MDM, its primary purpose is to support standardized digital workplaces that can be redeployed at any time without causing significant business disruption

More on Intune


How to protect your infrastructure

1. Protect admin accounts with phishing-resistant MFA

Every privileged account should be enforced with phishing-resistant MFA. This includes Passkeys and FIDO2 security keys.

Enforce every authentication to sensible workloads with Conditional Access and an Authentication Strength to only permit phishing-resistant methods.

Entra Authentication OverviewMicrosoft Entra authentication overview: authentication methods, MFA and passwordless options, use cases and security recommendations.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner

2. Use just-in-time and just-enough access for critical operations

No admin should ever be assigned with permanent Global Administrator access. Most accounts in the wild are over-privileged for their use case.

Set up Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to grant only just-in-time and just-enough access.

Privileged Identity Management (PIM) concept + setupMicrosoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) concept and setup: role sources, assignment types, PIM for groups, audit logs and governance.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner

Also consider Intunes own RBAC system to granularly give permissions on different tasks in Intune, such as policy manipulation or remote actions like delete or wipe.

Additionally, anytime you assign any privileges to a group in Entra ID, enable the immutable switch "roles can be assigned to this group". With that, only Global Admins and Privileged Role Admins can add members to such a group. This prevents privilege escalation.

Intune RBAC permissionsIntune role-based access control (RBAC): role concept, migrating roles, governance and auditing who can do what in the Intune admin center.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner

3. Leverage Multi Admin Approval

Multi Admin Approval has been in Intune for years, but flying under the radar. Essentially, it is a dual-control system, so applying admin configurations requires approval from a secondary admin before getting effective. Check out my dedicated blog post on it:

The easy Intune Multi Admin Approval GuideIntune Multi Admin Approval (MAA) guide: how two-admin approval works for policies, apps and remote actions, plus considerations from the field.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner

4. Level up Conditional Access policies with Authentication Contexts

Conditional Access should be in place for every Microsoft 365 tenant. But only few organizations use it effectively to secure critical operations such as admin interaction with management portals. Authentication Context in combination with Protected Actions and PIM should be considered!

Advanced Conditional AccessAdvanced Conditional Access in Microsoft Entra ID: protected actions, authentication contexts and combining Conditional Access with PIM.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner

5. Proactively Log & Monitor your infrastructure

Last, but not least, keep in mind that Entra ID logs and Intune logs are only collected for 30 days by default. Furthermore, analyzation and visualization capabilities remain limited.

In my opinion, storing logs in a Log Analytics Workspace for at least 180 days should be mandatory. Especially, in the case of a breach logs are the primary source to reconstruct the attack and understand impact.

Log analytics: the basicsAzure Log Analytics basics: what a workspace is for, how log collection works and how to analyze Microsoft Entra ID and Intune data with KQL.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner

Bonus:

This Azure Workbook from me provides a centralized solution for monitoring and analyzing audit logs to maintain full visibility over your Microsoft Intune environment. By grouping disparate event data into a single pane of glass, it enables administrators to easily track configuration changes, device operations, and identity assignments. Learn more:

Intune change tracking (Azure Workbook)Track configuration changes in Microsoft Intune with an Azure Monitor workbook: audit profiles, apps, scripts and device operations in one view.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner


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OceanleafTechnology blog on Microsoft Cloud. Learn about cutting edge tech, explained simply & straightforward in quality focused blog posts.Oceanleaf · Niklas Tinner

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Niklas Tinner

2x Microsoft MVP · Founder of Oceanleaf

Writes about AI, Intune, Entra, Defender and Global Secure Access.

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